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Would Recession Induce More Intermediation in the Corrupt Informal Sector? 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper my endeavor is to give you an idea about the upshot of a recessionary phase 
on the intermediation activity which is required for the survival of the informal fragment 
of the society. Informal part of the economy covers a large chunk of the total economic 
activities in any stylized developing economy. Therefore it is imperative to check 
possible consequences of recession on this subdivision because intermediation also 
requires unskilled work force which need to be pulled out from the productive spectrum. 
In doing so I would be using the hybrid of standard Heckscher - Ohlin and Specific 
Factor general equilibrium models of trade. I would also strive to focus on the wage-
inequality paradigm. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recession and the consequent effects on different economics have grabbed the attention 
of the development economists across the globe in the recent past. Most of the economies on the 
both sides of the Atlantic are severely affected by the global financial crisis led recession with 
the exception of some developing economies such as India. Since the main channels through 
which recessionary impacts are trickled down from USA to other developed and developing 
countries are trade-based, mainly trade economists are more interested than others in tracing out 
the possible fall outs. In this paper my prime focus would be the developing economy where 
both formal and informal fragments exist in tandem. Sometimes informal activities cover the 
major chunk of total economic functions (e.g. 90% of Indian economy comes under informal 
segment if agriculture is taken into account). Formal goods are customarily considered as traded 
whereas the informal goods are non-traded per se. empirical supports for formal sectors’ 
happenings could be easily availed from secondary data source but for the informal activities it is 
very difficult to provide with the statistical findings. Because, by definition informal activities 
are unregistered and extra-legal, if not illegal.  A few papers have already been written to capture 
the post-recession reality of the developing nations that comprises of both formal and informal 
zones. Mandal (2009b), Chaudhuri (2009) and Marjit et al (2009) have nicely brought into the 
concept of informal sector in a standard theoretical model and explained some likely 
consequences. Mandal (2009b) has shown that informal workers actually benefit from the 
recession whereas the capitalist are the worst sufferers. In the output front informal segment, in 
fact, expands whereas formal unskilled segment must contract. On the other hand Chaudhuri 
(2009), using a Harris-Todaro kind of framework has explained how recession could put a mark 
on the informal workers. Again Marjit et al (2009) included a tradeable informal good in a 
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general equilibrium model to check the robustness of an increase in informal wage due to 
recession.    
However, none of the existing papers attempted to capture another reality: informal 
sector is always beset with extortion or corruption as the survival of the so-called extra-legal 
activity crucial depends on the negotiation between informal producers and administrators. One 
may easily argue over the type of corruption, nature of negotiation required in this fragment but 
the undeniable fact is that corruption related extortion is omnipresent in the informal counter part 
of the society.1 This sort of intermediation or manipulation is precisely done by a group of labor 
who are termed as intermediators or extortionists. In this model no skilled workers are used in 
manipulation linked works. Intermediators are paid out of the price of informal good(s). I shall 
try to invoke this phenomenon in a standard trade theoretic general equilibrium set up. Two 
earlier papers by Marjit and Mandal (2008), Mandal and Marjit (2010) and Mandal (2009a) have 
used the similar notion to consider such an issue of corruption. 
The current papers uses the Heckscher-Ohlin nugget kind of framework developed in 
Gruen and Corden (1970), Jones and Marjit (1992, 2009) that resembles complementarity 
structure. This is essentially a hybrid of Heckscher-ohlin and Specific factor models of trade. 
This structure has more often than not been used to assess the development policies. 
The paper is schematized as follows. Introduction is followed by the model in section 2. 
Section 3 delivers the basic result with explanations. Section 4 contains concluding remarks. 
2. THE MODEL 
The economy that we consider here is a small one characterized by the co-existence of 
formal and informal subdivisions. X and Y are traded and are being produced in the formal set 
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up following neo-classical production function. X uses skilled labor and Y uses unskilled 
workforce with the homogenous capital. Capital is perfectly mobile across sectors and goods. 
Note that unskilled workers wage is pre-determined by trade union in Y. There is another 
commodity, Z, the informal good. Z is being produced the unskilled workers and homogenous 
capital. Unskilled wage in the informal sector is expectedly less than unionized wage since who 
do not find jobs in the formal part fall back on the informal counter part. No one can afford to 
remain unemployed. This is precisely the reason why informal sector exists as it provides means 
of survival to some people. And perhaps the existence of informal sector also helps satisfying the 
full employment criterion for the developing countries. 
Corruption related intermediation in our framework switches labor from productive to 
corruptive activities. Thus corruption is viewed as directly unproductive profit seeking activity as 
some people engaged in corruption essentially avail of the arbitrage opportunities, acting as 
middlemen and intermediaries. Such diversion of human talent can be quite costly for the society 
as effective labor endowment shrinks. α  is the fraction of  value of per unit Z that could be spent 
on extortionists for doing intermediation allied assignment.   This is done only by unskilled 
workers.  This sector is represented by C. Thus unskilled workers have three options:  to work in 
Y or in Z or in C. All the markets are competitive. Competitive market for extortion ensures that 
lost value of output would be exactly equal to the payment made to the unskilled workers who 
actually do the intermediations. 
The system of equations would be as follows. Note that we would be intimately 
following the structure of Marjit and Mandal (2008) and be using the standard symbols that are 
frequently used in stylized general equilibrium trade models. 
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Non-existence of supernormal profits entails that the competitive price equations be: 
      = 	                 (1) 

      = 	         (2) 
      = 	1        (3) 
Note that  
   because of the trade union exercise in the formal unskilled segment. 
.   . 	.                                                    (4) 
Factors’ full employment conditions are defined as: 
 .           (5) 
 .   .           (6) 
 .   .    .    
    (7) 
The structure we just built is merely a recursive one. X uses a specific factor in form of 
skilled labor (S). Y and Z share the unskilled labor as the mobile factor (L). Whereas capital (K) 
is perfectly mobile across all X, Y and Z. It is important to keep in mind throughout that  , the 
degree of corruption or extortion is exogenous in the model.  
We have some typical essential phenomena in our model. Only the formal goods’ prices 
are determined from the international market and the formal unskilled workers get fixed wage 
rate. Formal unskilled wage is, essentially, the prime driving force of this paper. On the other 
hand as the informal good is non-traded no international economic shock like recession can 
percolate into the informal segment of the economy through price effect. Whatever happens to 
this segment that that would be through the changes in relative factor returns. Therefore, once the 
recessionary phase starts, by virtue of the structure of the model, capital gets the first jostle as 
unskilled wage is pre-fixed in the formal segment. Capitalists internalizing the distress would 
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help increasing the skilled workers’ wage if the price of skilled goods does not alter. However, as 
the informal good’s price remains unchanged, the informal workers must gain as the return to the 
mobile factor has already gone down. However, in output front there might be some interesting 
outcomes. After being disappointed in the formal unskilled segment capital immediately flows 
out and subsequently the output contracts. Whereas in the skilled segment, producers try to 
substitute skilled labor by relatively less costly capital. Thus the output effect here depends on 
the relative changes in factor return. Nevertheless, in the informal sector, as wage goes up, there 
could be some changes in Lc. The eventual output effects on Y and Z will substantially depend 
on the factor intensity comparison between Y and Z.  In this paper our prime focus would be on 
Lc or w.Lc, the size of the intermediation activity. 
Here equation (1) represents the specific factor structure while equations (2) and (3) 
resemble the Heckscher-Ohlin subsystem. This is how the hybrid nature of our model come into 
play. Px and Py are determined in the world market. r is solved for from equation (2) as wage is 
pre-fixed at 
 .  can be easily calculated from (1) because r is already calculated. Thus non-
unionized informal wage, w is determined from (3) for any given  and Pz. By means of CRS 
and DMP assumptions all  ! s are determined. Now let us start from any positive Lc such that 
     0. Hence X is derived from (5) and Y and Z are simultaneously determined from (6) 
and (7) for given factor endowments. 
Moreover, we can also solve for the equilibrium value of Lc or the size of the extortion 
sector in our model. Once w is determined the LHS of equation (4) would be an increasing 
function of Lc with slope w. As Lc goes up, availability of productive unskilled labor shrinks. 
Thus what would happen to the RHS of (4) and output of Z that crucially depends on the factor 
intensity assumption of Z compared to Y. If Z happens to be the labor-intensive one, output of Z 
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must fall. Rationality suggests the assumption of a labor-intensive Z. Therefore the RHS of (4) 
must be declining in Lc for given given  and Pz. Hence the value of equilibrium Lc is worked 
out for given degree of extortion, w and Pz. Determination of equilibrium Lc is shown in 
diagram-1. 
 Lc.w,. 	.                                                 
      LHS in Equation (4) 
 
              
             E  
 
RHS in Equation (4) 
        w 
               O                 LcE                 Lc 
                                                                                                                                   
     Figure -1 
                   Determination of equilibrium Lc for given w, Pz and   
In this model, in conjunction with the price effect caused by recession people, the real 
possibility of endowment effect is explored. We are not talking about that kind of Rybczynski 
effect which originates from a change in factor return (making the constraint less or more 
binding). In our model we have, in fact, two types of Rybczynski effects. One originates from 
change in the factors’ return, the conventional way to look at the complementarity structure. The 
other one comes from the direct change in the unskilled labor endowment for productive 
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purpose. Once the return to unskilled workers, w changes the output of Y and will change, 
depending upon the intensity of factor used. With the change in Z production the number of 
intermediators is likely to change. This will then and there initiate another round of Rybczynski 
effect. Therefore the second category of Rybczynski effect essentially enters through the change 
in the size of the intermediation sector that requires only unskilled labor which has another 
alternative employment options in the production of Y and Z. 
3. BASIC RESULTS AND THE EXPLANATIONS 
 In this paper my prime focus would be to check the potential effects on the size of the 
extortion sector and on the wage inequality conundrum consequents upon recessionary shocks. 
For this purpose let us start from some facts that are explored in UNCTAD secretariat 
calculations (2009). The report emphasizes that there is 37% decline in the price of all 
commodities’ group excluding crude petroleum in between 2008 and January 2009. The crude 
petroleum price in isolation has been decreased by 67% in the same period. In case of service 
trade it has been observed that service export growth had started declining in the third quarter of 
2008 with a sudden fall in the last quarter of 2008. Therefore, it is, by and large, accepted that 
prices of traded goods have been reduced in the phase of economic recession. 
The comparative static properties of this model can be established by considering the 
effects of changes in the parameters like goods’ prices. In this model the resultant effect of a 
decrease in the prices of the formal goods would be first felt in Y. As wage is pre-fixed, the first 
shove would on the capital and thus r would fall. Now, what is going to happen to the Ws that 
depends on the relative strengths of a fall in r and Px. Nevertheless, w would inevitably increase 
in the informal sector as  and Pz are assumed to be constants for the time being. The change in 
w will invoke some adjustment process in the size of the extortion sector and subsequent changes 
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in the commodity output. This would again lead to another round of adjustment in equation (4). 
Let us try to show the mathematical nitty-gritty through which this model works. 
Totally differentiating the price equations we have 
# $  ̂$  	&    (8) 
 
'$  ̂$  	&    (9) 
# $  ̂$  	&1. #   (10) 

'  0, because 
  is always pre-determined. 
Setting 
'  0 in equation (9) we can solve for ̂ and then substituting it in (8) we get the value 
for # . Hence  
̂  )&*+,*                                                 (11) 
#   -	&  )&*+,* $  . /+01   (12) 
Again using (11) in (10) we can have the value of # , 
#  2	&1. # 	&  +,3$456 /+73   (13) 
The intuitive explanations for the value of changes are very simple to follow.2 When Px and Py 
fall, Pz remains constant3 and  remains constant throughout, 
̂ 8 0;    
#  0 4 ; 
# : 0  iff ;+,1$45; : ;)&1	'5;  
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$ is likely to be greater than $ as skilled good normally requires more capital. Therefore,  if 
Px falls less (more) than Py, Ws will increase (decrease). 
Differentiating equation (4) one gets, 
<= # 	'  >  #                    (14) 
         Implication of (14) is quite simple to understand. When  and Pz are constants an increase 
in Z induce more people to be employed as intermediators while a simultaneous increase in w 
would affect Lc in opposite way since people’s natural tendency would be to work as productive 
factors not as an intermediators. Therefore, a positive #  would lead to a fall in Lc. 
 With any change in the goods’ price there must be some sort of revision in the factor 
returns, these must impact the final output. As the endowments of factors are constants producer 
would go for substituting the factors in use depending on the elasticity of substitution, internal 
reallocation of factors etc. The effects on output could be systematically determined as follows. 
 Let us assume that the factors’ endowment are given and constants. Totally 
differentiating the full employment condition (5) – (7) and using the concept of elasticity of 
substitution one can have, 
&  >  ?                            (15) 
&@  >@  @A$#  ̂  @A$̂  <= @<       (16) 
&@  >@  @A$#  ̂  @A$̂  @AB  ̂  (17) 
Setting #  	'  0, equation (14) can be modified as 
  
12 
 
<=  >  #                    (18) 
Where,    A  C?,1DC?01E#0DF̂ ;   A  C?,*DC?7*E
' DF̂ ;   A  C?,3DC?73E# DF̂  
Solving for & we get 
&  AB  ̂$                                                       (19) 
However, the solutions for & and >  are not very straightforward. Because the same unskilled 
labor is used not only in Y and Z but also in the sector C which takes care of the administrative 
negotiation activities. Thus, we need to go for simultaneous determination of &, > and  <= .  
          Equation (16), (17) and (18) can alternatively be represented in the following matrix form. 
J@ @ 0  @ @ @<0 1 1   K J
&>L=K = J
@A$#  ̂  @A$̂  @AB  ̂  @A$#  ̂  @A$̂# K 
Using the Cramer’s rule we can simultaneously solve for &, >  and <=. 
&  /|N| O@A$̂   @AB  ̂  @A$#  ̂P@  @<Q  @  R @A$#  ̂ 
@A$̂  @<#QS        (20) 
>  /|N| O@@<#   @@A ̂T$  $U   @@A$#  ̂   @@A$#  ̂ 
@ @AB  ̂S        (21) 
<=  /|N| O @@A ̂T$  $U  #T @@   @@U   @@A$#  ̂ 
 @@A$#  ̂  @ @AB  ̂  S        
       (22) 
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Here, |V|  W@ @ 0  @ @ @<0 1 1 W 
=@@<  @  @@  @  @1  @    (23)  
Note that 1  @  @  @. And if Y is relatively capital intensive, @  @ or, 
@  @. Therefore it is most likely that |V|  0.  
Thus, if capitalists are the worst sufferers among all factors, i.e B  ̂  0 ,  & 8 0; >  0 . 
But the value of Lc is ambiguous. 
<= : 0  XYY   
Z @@A$#  ̂   @@A$#  ̂  @  @AB  ̂ @@A ̂T$  $UZ :
Z#T @@   @@UZ         (24) 
     A careful investigation of equation (24) reveals that an increase in informal wage, #  is 
actually dampening the positive effect on Lc, nothing else. This also evident from equation (14). 
The change in Y and Z are also very crucial as both these goods share the same kind labor with 
the intermediation sector. All the effects are simultaneously captured in equation (22). However, 
it is most likely that Lc should increase consequent upon recession. Higher production of Z must 
call for more intermediators to sort out the problem of negotiation. And if Lc increases the size 
of the intermediation sector (= w.Lc) would increase unambiguously as #  0 otherwise we 
need to weigh the positive effect caused by #  with the negative effects in equation (4). 
Thus the following proposition is immediate: 
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Proposition 1: Consequent upon recession the size of the intermediation sector must expand if Y 
is relatively labor-intensive and the following condition is satisfied. The precise condition is     
Z @@A$#  ̂   @@A$#  ̂  @  @AB  ̂ @@A ̂T$  $UZ :
Z#T @@   @@UZ  
Another interesting result that we can derive from our analysis is the implication for the 
existing wage inequality as (Ws-W)>0 to start with. If Px does not change wage inequality must 
reduce as W must increase. Even when Px falls wage inequality may fall if Ws falls. This will 
happen when ;+,1$45; 8 ;)&1	'5;. However, if ;+,1$45;  ;)&1	'5;, the outcome in relative wage distribution 
front is really unclear. In this circumstances the wage-inequality problem will worsen (or 
ameliorate) if ;-	'[  	'5$45 $4[ . 1$\[; : ;2	&1. # 	&  +,3$456 /+73;. 
  4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper I have constructed a general equilibrium trade model using the hybrid 
structure of Heckscher-Ohlin and Specific Factor model with a corrupt informal sector to 
substantiate what could happen to the size of the intermediation sector due to an economic 
recession. It has been shown that the size is likely to increase. This paper also has an inference 
regarding the wage-inequality problem. If skilled good’s price does not decrease much compared 
to the unskilled formal good, wage-inequality must fall.   
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Footnote 
1. For a detailed analysis of the causes of the existence of the informal sector interested 
readers may look at Marjit and Kar (2009), Marjit (2009). Marjit and Kar (2009) clearly 
elaborates the interconnectedness of the informal sector with other sectors of the 
economy and some policy implications. 
 
2. One can refer to Mandal (2009b) for a detailed explanation. 
 
3. When the informal good is considered to be a substitute for the formal unskilled good 
price of the informal good should rise in the recessionary situation. Traditionally formal 
good’s price is greater than that of informal good. People’s demand for relatively cheaper 
good will increase that would pull up Pz. 
 
4. If 	 rises and  will increase further. 
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